Ethics and images of suffering bodies in humanitarian medicine  by Calain, Philippe
at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Social Science & Medicine 98 (2013) 278e285Contents lists availableSocial Science & Medicine
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/socscimedEthics and images of suffering bodies in humanitarian medicine
Philippe Calain*
Unité de Recherche sur les Enjeux et Pratiques Humanitaires (UREPH), Médecins Sans Frontières e Switzerland, Rue de Lausanne 78, CH-1211
Genève 21, Switzerlanda r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Available online 27 July 2012
Keywords:
Communications media
Medical ethics
Codes of ethics
Informed consent
Non-governmental organisations
Photojournalism
Photography
Stereotyping
Bodies
Images* Tel.: þ41 22 849 84 84; fax: þ41 22 849 84 88.
E-mail address: philippe_calain@hotmail.com.
0277-9536  2012 Elsevier Ltd.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2012.06.027
 
Open access under CC Ba b s t r a c t
Media representations of suffering bodies from medical humanitarian organisations raise ethical ques-
tions, which deserve critical attention for at least three reasons. Firstly, there is a normative vacuum at
the intersection of medical ethics, humanitarian ethics and the ethics of photojournalism. Secondly, the
perpetuation of stereotypes of illness, famine or disasters, and their political derivations are a source of
moral criticism, to which humanitarian medicine is not immune. Thirdly, accidental encounters between
members of the health professions and members of the press in the humanitarian arena can result in
misunderstandings and moral tension. From an ethics perspective the problem can be speciﬁed and
better understood through two successive stages of reasoning. Firstly, by applying criteria of medical
ethics to the concrete example of an advertising poster from a medical humanitarian organisation, I
observe that media representations of suffering bodies would generally not meet ethical standards
commonly applied in medical practice. Secondly, I try to identify what overriding humanitarian
imperatives could outweigh such reservations. The possibility of action and the expression of moral
outrage are two relevant humanitarian values which can further be spelt out through a semantic analysis
of ‘témoignage’ (testimony). While the exact balance between the opposing sets of considerations
(medical ethics and humanitarian perspectives) is difﬁcult to appraise, awareness of all values at stake is
an important initial standpoint for ethical deliberations of media representations of suffering bodies.
Future pragmatic approaches to the issue should include: exploring ethical values endorsed by photo-
journalism, questioning current social norms about the display of suffering, collecting empirical data
from past or potential victims of disasters in diverse cultural settings, and developing new canons with
more creative or less problematic representations of suffering bodies than the currently accepted
stereotypes.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
Images of victims of trauma, illness, destitution or disasters are
omnipresent and form a conspicuous part of mainstream public
informationworldwide. The naturalness of this social phenomenon
has already been questioned or opened to ethical inquiry
(Dauphinée, 2007; Ignatieff, 1985; Kleinman & Kleinman, 1996).
Furthermore, speciﬁc criticisms have been addressed to humani-
tarian or developmental organisations acting as mediators of the
representations of victims. For example, Plewes and Stuart (2007)
and Kennedy (2009) argue that the imagery of victims for fund-
raising purposes provokes considerable tension with humanitarian
values.
My main introductory remark is that the topic is too often cur-
tailed because of established social norms. One idea that I hope toY-NC-ND license.convey in this paper is that social norms are confusing ethical
debates around media representations of victims. Nowadays, the
sort of public displays of ‘suffering bodies’ which are generally
accepted by the public are supposed to fulﬁl at least two conditions:
(i) the display should convey some precise meaning, for example
through a ‘communications’ argument; and (ii) the display should
be technically conveyed, for example through press photographs,
ﬁlmed documentaries, television broadcasts, advertisements or
online video clips. Taking Fig. 1 as an example, one could easily
illustrate these basic conditions of public acceptance with two
thought experiments. The ﬁrst would be to hypothetically modify
the poster and remove any explanatory content (i.e. the caption, but
also the attending doctor and his afﬁliation). As a result, the same
picture of the attended victim would become meaningless and
therefore unacceptable or at least suspicious to the usual target
audience. A signiﬁer, preferably a personality or a volunteer from
a humanitarian organisation should be attached to the picture to
‘authenticate’ the victim (Brauman, 1993, p. 150). In a second
experiment, the need for technical media conveyance to ensure
Fig. 1. Poster commissioned in 2009 by the Australian section of Médecins Sans Frontières [reproduced with permissions from MSF (Sydney) and Lavender (Sydney)].
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following scenario: together with the attending doctor, the same
victim from Aceh is displayed in person and ’immediately’ to public
view, this time laid behind a glass panel in a crowded street of
Sydney, one among wealthy cities where the audience targeted by
the poster lives. Such contempt for dignity and privacy would cause
public offence beyond the reason that, for the fact of being dis-
played, the patient would obviously have been brought from Aceh
to Sydney. The same sort of offence would be caused were
a homeless and sick person from Sydney substituted for the victim
from Aceh. What is going on here is a two-sided effect: pictorial
display makes distant suffering not only closer to potential donors
(Kennedy, 2009), but also socially acceptable by being mediatized.
One should remember from an historical point of view that social
norms and the limits of moral responsibility are evolving in this
regard (Haskell, 1985). For example, public tours to Bethlem, an
insane asylum in Georgian England, were routinely organised until
1770 so the public could observe inmates and thus ‘generate good
will’ (Andrews, Briggs, Porter, Tucker, &Waddington,1997, (Chapter
13: Visiting), p. 182). What counts for acceptance nowadays is the
artiﬁcial distance (geographical or psychological) between the
observer and the victim, and this is precisely why communications
media exist. Obviously, any subjective sense of distance is enhanced
if the victim and the viewer belong to socially or culturally distinct
groups, an inevitable occurrence in the mediatized relationship
between ‘donors’ and ‘beneﬁciaries’ of humanitarian assistance.
While the two conditions introduced so far, i.e. meaning and
technical display, are generally sufﬁcient for pictorial representa-
tions of victims to ﬁt current social norms, public acceptance itself
does not necessarily imply moral rightness. In this paper, I argue
that representations of suffering bodies displayed in the context of
humanitarian medicine take on a particular signiﬁcance from an
ethical viewpoint and conceal unresolved divisions between
different value systems.
A similar argument has already been made by others (Kennedy,
2009; Plewes & Stuart, 2007). Taking a slightly different approach,
my own ethical reﬂection about suffering bodies and humanitarian
action is derived primarily from a medical perspective, bearing inmind that images can express suffering through several sorts of
bodily representations, e.g. wounds, scars, images of dead bodies,
the facial expressions of mental distress or shame. These images
would normally belong to the private sphere of medical encoun-
ters, were it not for the fact that they appear at the same time in the
realm of humanitarian action. Moreover, following Tiktin (2006a,
pp. 117e118), I am speciﬁcally referring here to ‘suffering bodies’
instead of ‘suffering persons’. This is to emphasize what several
scholars have noted, i.e. the fact that representations in humani-
tarian iconography are typically those of anonymous, speechless,
ahistorical or generic stereotypes of victims (see for example: Butt,
2002; Malkki, 1996; Ticktin, 2006b).
Having so far outlined current social norms about the imaging of
suffering bodies, I will next illustrate how such representations
create problems in the practice of humanitarian medicine. To be
more precise, I will use a concrete example to show how tensions
arise between medical ethics and humanitarian perspectives of the
representations of suffering. Finally, in an attempt to make
headway in clarifying these tensions, I will try to identify what
overriding humanitarian values could outweigh such reservations
about the imaging of suffering bodies, as those raised by a medical
ethics standpoint.
Three pragmatic reasons why images of suffering are
problematic in humanitarian medicine
There are at least three important reasons why the pictorial
representations of suffering bodies in humanitarian medicine need
to be examined from an ethical point of view.
My ﬁrst reason is normative. Such representations raise moral
questions that intertwine in at least three disciplines and their
incompletely codiﬁed sets of values: medical ethics (World Medical
Association, 2005 & 2006), humanitarian ethics (Hunt, 2011), and
the journalistic ethics (Council of Europe, 1993; UNESCO, 2012).
This disciplinary segmentation leaves us without clear universal
guidance as to what standards should be applied to photojour-
nalismwhen used or called upon by humanitarian organisations. In
this paper, I will mostly examine the clash of values between
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latter rely on the public display of images for achieving humani-
tarian goals. Except for a personal testimony (see below), I will
provisionally leave out the perspective of journalists acting inde-
pendently of humanitarian organizations in the scope of my anal-
ysis. Their perspective would probably introduce different or
additional sets of values or concerns, encompassing, for example,
the right of the public to be informed or other sources of profes-
sional, corporate and individual obligations endorsed by the press.
My second reason has to dowith one of the most frequent moral
criticisms of humanitarianism and its media representations. The
argument, put forward by eminent scholars, can be summarised as
follows: humanitarian action perpetuates a distinct worldview of
asymmetrical power relationships, contributing to the ‘humani-
tarian reduction of the victim’ as a passive recipient of aid (Fassin,
2007, p. 517; Hours, 1998, pp. 159e167; Kleinman & Kleinman,
1996). Furthermore, from the 1970s relief agencies have enter-
tained a symbiotic relationship with the international media,
resulting in distorted representations of victims of crisis and
stereotypes of Third World poverty (Benthall, 2010, (Chapter 5:
Images and narratives of disaster relief, pp. 186e188); Butt, 2002;
DeChaine, 2002; De Waal, 1997, pp. 82e85). Such criticism of the
media representations of humanitarian actions can take trenchant
expression, for example Plewes and Stuart (2007, pp. 23e27)
qualifying pictures of Africans displayed by developmental NGOs
as ‘the pornography of poverty’, or KatyMigiro (2011) writing about
‘starvation pornography’. The media representations of some
humanitarian crises, to which humanitarian organisations inevi-
tably partake as necessary relief providers, can also convey ques-
tionable and partial messages about the political world order.
Ideological and opportunistic biases in the reporting of the Ethio-
pian famine of 1984 (Sorenson, 1991) illustrate the difﬁculties for
relief organisations to avoid the trap of being manipulated by their
portrayals by the media. The same argument of political bias was
put forward when the ‘famine pictures’ of Biafra became news in
1968 (De Waal, 1997, pp. 72e77). In diametrically opposed argu-
ment, the display of ‘famine icons’ and their de-contextualised
appeals to emotions have been criticised as being oblivious to the
root political causes of food shortages and social destitution
(Campbell, 2011). Thus, humanitarian organisations proceed along
a thin line of alleged political neutrality when they appeal to the
media the reporting of famines and other disasters.
My third reason for undertaking this ethics review relates to
overt conﬂicts of opinion and professional values. Interactions
between humanitarian actors and the media can result in con-
ﬂicting situations and moral tension, particularly in the course of
disasters or other extreme circumstances. For example, in his public
account of the Rwandan genocide, Philippe Gaillard (2004), head of
the ICRC delegation in Kigali in 1994, expressed his fury about some
members of the press and stated, “Most, but not all, journalists are
like vultures, waiting to pounce on the latest scoop, only interested in
ﬁlming grim and gruesome scenes.”
The tension between members of different professions navi-
gating in the complex circumstances of an humanitarian emer-
gency was also documented on the occasion of an outbreak of Ebola
fever in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)
in 1995. Different historical and contextual circumstances made
this outbreak a source of international concern, particularly
attractive to the international press (Haynes, 2002). At the time I
happened to be assigned to the management of an isolation
pavilion in the main hospital of Kikwit, where patients were dying
in dire conditions. To collect photographs and motion pictures,
members of the press made several attempts to enter the isolation
ward, oblivious to the consent of patients or their families or simply
to the prevailing conditions of contagion. Most of the victims werein critical condition, obviously unable to object to any unwelcome
intrusion. As later reported with some accuracy by Garrett (2001,
(Chapter 2: Landa-landa, p. 78)), tensions were high and verbal
violence erupted on several occasions between reporters and
health care professionals. There was simply no chance for a dia-
logue to reasonably expose the source of our diverging points of
view. As an exception, which I remember vividly, one photographer
from a European country came back to express his point of view
after the ﬁrst day of a ﬁlming expedition. This was a tense but
interesting encounter for me. The photographer proffered three
sets of arguments in defence of the press, arguments which I have
subsequently heard on several occasions and which are worth of
reﬂection. The ﬁrst argument was one of cultural relativism, i.e.
people on the African continent are allegedly less concerned by
issues of privacy and autonomy. Although I feel this perspective
worth mentioning, I will not go any further into it, both because of
the resentment shared by Zairian colleagues when told of this
conversation, and the absence of empirical evidence to dismiss the
argument outright. In his second argument, the photographer
claimed that victims of disasters (as individuals and as communi-
ties) gain comfort from the idea that their pleas, or their very
existence, are not forgotten. With such reasoning, the act of taking
pictures would be an ostensible way to express attention, solidarity,
and empathy with their sufferings. His third argument was about
accountability: relief organisations could not exist if there were no
photographers ready to communicate the images of what is actu-
ally being achieved in the ﬁeld to donors and supporters of the
victims.
Althoughmy experience is anecdotal, it shows how protagonists
in different disciplines (medicine and journalism in this case) can
provide humanitarian or ethical arguments to justify their own
positions. It is thus important to map and specify the full scope of
moral reasons put forth for or against the display of suffering bodies
as part of humanitarian practice.
Medical ethics and photography
Much of the literature about medical ethics and photography
draws from normative considerations established in Europe and
the USA. It is generally limited in scope to the case of medical
imaging for archival, forensic or educational reasons, including
scientiﬁc publications (Berle, 2008; Creighton, Alderson, Brown, &
Minto, 2002). For example, the International Committee of
Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE, 2009) issued stringent rules
requiring guarantees of privacy, conﬁdentiality and consent in the
reporting of research, including identiﬁcation through photo-
graphs. In line with others (Slue, 1989), the ICMJE considers the
masking of the eyes in photographing patients as inadequate in
protecting anonymity. In the UK, a process for consent for the visual
and audio recording of patients has been thoroughly codiﬁed
(Hood, Hope, & Dove, 1998). It includes several categories of
consent, drawing attention to the possibility that the image might
also be used in electronic publication. Limited data from the UK
indicate that a majority of patients would agree to their pictures
being displayed for educational purposes (Cheung, Al-Ausi,
Hathorn, Hyam, & Jaye, 2005; Hood et al., 1998; Nichol & Davies,
1998).
Commercial ﬁlming in hospitals for broadcast television seems
to have become more common in the USA, where several legal or
institutional rules are in place to protect individual patients’ rights
to privacy, conﬁdentiality and individually informed consent
(Geiderman & Larkin, 2002).
In contrast, several authors have pointed out much lower
standards of ethical and legal protection in cases of clinical
photography taken in the southern hemisphere (MacIntosh, 2006),
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disasters. For example, reacting to graphic images of Iraqi casualties
displayed by Al-Jazeera Singh and DePellegrin (2003) believe that,
‘.doctors owe patients basic duties of care that should not be
suspended during times of war.When patients enter a hospital they
have legitimate expectations to conﬁdentiality, privacy, dignity,
autonomy, and to have their informed consent solicited before their
images are captured.’ Bhan (2005) expressed similar concerns about
victims of the 2004 Asian tsunami and their grieving relatives, ‘The
public’s right to information should not outweigh the right of victims of
natural disasters to privacy, conﬁdentiality and dignity’. These and
other accounts (Bhan, 2009; Roy, 2006) suggest that health
personnel have professional and moral obligations to protect their
patients from media intrusion, but also that fulﬁlling these obli-
gations is very difﬁcult in times of crisis. One related but unresolved
question for medical humanitarianworkers attending communities
is to what degree these obligations of protection extend outside the
premises of health-care facilities.
Applying a common moral calculus to a poster
Oneway to better grasp the tension betweenmedical ethics and
humanitarian representations of suffering bodies is to extend the
substantive rules of moral reasoning commonly used in clinical
practice to the speciﬁc case of pictorial display. What those
common rules could be can be inferred from the four basic prin-
ciples of biomedical ethics deﬁned by Beauchamp and Childress
(2009): respect for autonomy, beneﬁcence, nonmaleﬁcence and
justice. In terms of respecting autonomy, rules can be gleaned
pertaining to imaging, such as consent, privacy, and conﬁdentiality.
One could also add: respecting dignity and avoiding community
stereotypes or cross-cultural paternalism. Justice implies the lack of
exploitation and the just distribution of any ancillary beneﬁts
generated by the production of images. Nonmaleﬁcence calls for
legal protection and risk minimization. Beneﬁcence is at the core of
humanitarian arguments and will be examined in later sections by
considering ‘action’ and ‘témoignage’.
The poster displayed in Fig. 1 (Zizola, 2009) was commissioned
by the humanitarian medical organisation Médecins Sans Fron-
tières (Doctors Without Borders - MSF) and published by an online
advertising community to acknowledge the merits of its design. It
illustrates current trends in humanitarian communications, in that
it avoids any offensive or extreme display of suffering or destitu-
tion. By applying common rules of biomedical ethics to Fig. 1 my
approach is thus a conservative one based on strict moral
reasoning. In other words, I am not appealing here to the kind of
feelings of indecency that might be evoked by an older generation
of humanitarian images (for a conspicuous historical example of
the latter, see photographs by Mark and Mccall (1985) during the
Ethiopian famine of 1984e1985). The MSF poster does not indicate
if the victim appears in the context of war, natural disaster or
otherwise chronic destitution. Nor is it clear if the setting belongs to
an established health care facility, private housing or an improvised
treatment centre open to the public. The caption is however
unambiguous in its fundraising objectives. Following common
practice in humanitarian imagery, this picture was not cleared for
publication by any ethics committee. Seeing the same patient dis-
played in a biomedical journal, with its ethical publishing policies
(Elsevier, 2012), is in itself evidence of an arbitrary segmentation of
disciplines in terms of ethical review requirements. Aside from an
ethics committee review, speciﬁc criteria derived from the four
principles enunciated by Beauchamp and Childress can be exam-
ined in more detail in the following manner.
A breach of privacy is inevitable in much of humanitarian
iconography. The visual intrusion extends from the photographerhimself to the much broader audience who will ultimately see the
poster. The fact that the poster was probably intended to be dis-
played abroad, away from the victim’s community, should not
minimise privacy concerns.
Conﬁdentiality is not an issue here, since no information is
provided as to the patient’s circumstances and diagnosis. Infor-
mational harm would arise if pictorial representations are part of
thematic narratives, whereby the patient’s diagnosis is implicitly
(or sometimes explicitly) rendered public, for example HIV
infection, tuberculosis, sexually-transmitted diseases or mental
conditions.
Although taking a picture might appear an innocuous act, some
risks are not negligible in humanitarian contexts. Stigmatization
through the identiﬁcation of a medical condition is one risk. Rarely,
but even more seriously, victims of violence might be identiﬁed by
their assailants, thus putting them in danger of retaliation.
Dignity is a rich but disputed concept (Jordan, 2010). It intui-
tively calls for deﬁning judgements in the representation of
suffering bodies. Feelings of offence to dignity can be elicited even
when victims remain totally anonymous. This can be sensed, for
example, by looking at a photograph of the naked corpse of
a woman being washed in preparation for a Muslim burial in the
Korem camp of northern Ethiopia (Mark and McCall, 1985). The
representation of stereotypical ﬁctional characters, even through
caricatures, can sometimes be seen as equally offensive. For
example, a recent cartoon by renowned artist Peter Brookes (British
Cartoon Archive, 2011) representing emaciated African children; it
was qualiﬁed as racist, cynical and repugnant by a group of scholars
(Akehurst et al., 2011). On the other hand, feelings of moral wrong
created by blatant displays of suffering, power imbalances or
destitution (e.g. nakedness, crippled bodies, slum environments)
can be molliﬁed by aesthetical perspectives or by a strong sense of
purpose. Commenting on the tension between dignity protection
and the needs of public interest, Berle (2008), a clinical photogra-
pher, claims that images of imprisoned Holocaust victims displayed
at the Yad Vashem memorial ‘honour and dignify those who were
wronged’. In other words, a strong moral purpose can outweigh the
unconsented display of extreme suffering.
We could also extend the concepts of autonomy and dignity
from the case of individuals whose bodies are on display to the
entire community that they symbolise. Accordingly, the perpetua-
tion of community stereotypes and cross-cultural paternalism is
a frequent criticism of humanitarianism (see for example Hours,
1998), and pictorial representations can remain the most
enduring remnants of a familiar narrative of western benefactors
attending remote ‘beneﬁciaries’, ‘those worst-off’ or ‘underserved’.
In an interesting twist to the argument, Laure Wolmark (2010)
challenges the stereotype of displaying victims of sexual violence
as anonymous, faceless, powerless and ashamed.
Legal protection from breaches of privacy by pictorial recordings
taken in the private and public spheres is vaguely grounded in
international human rights law, but more robustly in some national
laws (for the example of Switzerland, see Werly, 2009). Impor-
tantly, Singh and DePellegrin (2003) remind us that publishing or
broadcasting images of prisoners of war is illegal under Article 13 of
the third Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (Nelson, 2003). When it comes to foreign
photographers reporting on humanitarian crises, it is doubtful if
local law would offer similar protection and be enforceable for the
beneﬁt of civilians. In conﬂict zones, there is thus an imbalance in
the extent of legal protection available to civilian vs. combatant
victims.
Finally, beneﬁt sharing and ownership have been common issues
debated by ethics committees when data are collected for research
purposes. They are equally relevant to clinical pictures posted in the
1 I am borrowing this example and part of the argument from MacIntosh (2006).
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taken for humanitarian purposes express an appeal to altruism and
beneﬁt a broader community of fellow sufferers. In that sense, the
concepts of ﬁnancial beneﬁt and ownership could be considered as
irrelevant by victims volunteering to donate their own images. The
fact that such pictures can ﬁnd their way to press agencies or non-
humanitarian, for-proﬁt media shows that the risk of exploitation is
not so remote and should be considered in any consent process.
The issue of consent
Most professional relief organisations and their afﬁliated
photographers are obviously mindful of concerns of privacy,
conﬁdentiality and risks, and they can exercise caution in at least
twoways: through technical adjustments towhat will be displayed,
and through obtaining consent. For example, MSF (2007a, 2007b)
has issued a number of recommendations applicable to photogra-
phers working on the organisation’s behalf. The difﬁculties in
obtaining informed consent and creating an environment condu-
cive to genuine choice, especially in developing countries, have
been frequently discussed in research ethics (e.g. see Bhutta, 2004).
Equal consideration of consent should be applied to other inter-
ventions than just research, and encompass the delivery of care as
well as the taking of pictures, particularly in contexts where
subjects of medical attention are utterly vulnerable. Compared to
taking biological samples or conducting a questionnaire, taking
someone’s picture has a peculiar feature: it can be done to an
unconsenting subject without direct contact by using distance and
magniﬁcation devices. While having one’s suffering body and death
photographed can be part of a personal life project in a totally
autonomous and organised way (see for example O’Connor,
Schatzberger, & Payne, 2003), it is doubtful if crisis situations can
ever be conducive to free consent or consent at all. Furthermore,
care givers asked to allow the entry of reporters into medical
facilities are not totally autonomous either insofar as they are
subject to the communications policies of their own organisations.
Asking humanitarian doctors or nurses to obtain consent from their
patients for non-medical imaging can present them with a dual-
allegiance dilemma. Generally speaking, genuine consent for
a picture should be sought by all reasonable means, but as too often
in humanitarian crises, circumstances realistically do not allow the
full process to take place. Another reason why consent is so prob-
lematic in humanitarian imagery is that the exact purposes of
representing suffering bodies are generally undeﬁned at the
moment of taking the photo. Finally, some empirical data indicate
mixed but generally positive feelings from victims or grieving
relatives exposed to media intrusion (Scanlon, 2006; Shearer,
1991). The amount of such data is however scant and limited to
cases of disasters that occurred in certain industrialised countries
where exposure to the media is more widely accepted than
elsewhere.
Moral necessities, actions and moral outrage
At this point, one could argue that upholding the common
values of biomedical ethics would make it difﬁcult to justify any
pictorial display of suffering bodies by humanitarian organisations,
particularly in the tense circumstances of a disaster or a humani-
tarian crisis. Some exceptions might be justiﬁed for medical
imaging, educational reasons or forensic purposes. Empirically,
such a strict recourse to medical ethics would run counter to usual
social norms, wherein the suffering shown by humanitarian orga-
nisations is commonly accepted by the public if it is meaningful and
appropriately depicted. More importantly than this kind of prag-
matic argument, many humanitarians would also claim that othernecessities can outweigh the usual obligations prescribed by
medical ethics. What these necessities of exposing suffering bodies
entail might depend on professional perspectives or expected
achievements. For example, the weight of necessity is clearly of
a different nature for such endeavours as medical imaging,
a commercial documentary, daily news, fundraising or artwork. But
humanitarian contexts force our imagination into deeper
perspectives about moral necessity. Three types of humanitarian
arguments may count as moral necessity in this context: actions in
response to the suffering of victims; moral outrage induced by
extreme causes or circumstances; and ‘témoignage’.
Reﬂecting on humanitarian action and its representation in the
media, Boltanski (2000) claims that the sight of suffering can only
be legitimate if it leads to action. A lack of action would expose the
spectator to accusations of perversity. In his ‘topics of pity’, Bol-
tanski examines the kind of worthwhile action that suffering bodies
could provoke in a distant spectator. He enumerates: indignation,
denunciation, accusation, sympathy for the benefactor’s interven-
tion or an aesthetic feeling giving rise to ‘a kind of morose medi-
tation on the human condition’ (Boltanski, 2000). Such actions and
even more practical ones are obviously part of the humanitarian
organisations’ remit.
But aside from consequent action, what other moral criteria
might outweigh canonical medical ethics in this debate? In 2001,
Florian Pilsczek (2001), a medical doctor and photographer, pub-
lished an illustrated account of his experience as a volunteer in
Cambodia in the CanadianMedical Association Journal (CMAJ).1 The
article included several pictures of clearly identiﬁable patients with
HIV infections, together with their clinical histories. Pilsczek
claimed that the photographs were taken with the permission of
the patients, and that ‘some of [them] expressed their desire to make
people in other countries aware of the situation in Cambodia’. In an
interesting commentary, Anne-Marie Todkill (2001), a CMAJ editor,
cautiously defended the publication of Pilsczek’s photographs.
Firstly, Pilsczek’s dual roles (as a physician and a professional
photographer) would oppose Susan Sontag’s claim that taking
a photograph is ‘essentially an act of non-intervention’ (Sontag, 1978,
p. 11). According to Todkill, ‘...the photographic intervention merely
widens it into a public and even political sphere, which is where
medicine, considered as a global enterprise, actually belongs’. Such
a reason seconds with Boltanski’s argument that action is a crite-
rion for the legitimacy of representing suffering. Then Todkill
considers what would have happened if Pilsczek’s report had been
bereft of pictorial illustrations. That would have been inconsistent
with a past initiative by the same journal to publish photographs of
prisoners at the infamous Tuol Sleng prison run by the Khmer
Rouge. Thus Todkill sees equal humanitarian merit to give readers
‘a glimpse into a new generation of suffering in Cambodia’. She
concludes that ‘We should not suppose that our comfortable notions
of privacy, conﬁdentiality and consent are deﬁnitive’.
Todkill’s second argument echoes Berle’s comment about
pictures of Holocaust victims at the Yad Vashem memorial, and the
strong moral message they convey, regardless of the obvious
impossibility to act in the present to prevent or mitigate those
victims’ past ordeal. A similar opinion is expressed by Susan Sontag
(1978, pp. 17e19), when she claims ‘Photographs cannot create
a moral position, but they can reinforce onedand can help build
a nascent one.’ This sort of ‘moral position’ is expressed more
explicitly by Sontag as ‘moral outrage’ or ‘the existence of a relevant
political consciousness’.
Thus what counts here as morally powerful necessities brought
about by humanitarian practice are both the capacity for the distant
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exceptional sources of the suffering being displayed. Taking the
latter argument to its limits, such causal circumstances as war,
disasters, exploitation, destitution and torture (Butler, 2009, pp.
63e100) could justify the unrestricted exposure of suffering bodies
in the name of humanitarian action. This is an important but
incomplete argument, open to the question about the limits of its
interpretation. By essence humanitarian medicine deals with
exceptional moral tensions (Calain, 2012). Accordingly it may be
morally justiﬁed to publish representations of any victim attended
by humanitarian practitioners. This is exactly the line of reasoning
suggested by Todkil, when she puts the former detainees of Tuol
Leng prison and the contemporary victims of HIV/AIDS in
Cambodia on equal moral footing. Further insight into this
controversial viewpoint can be gained from analysing the concept
of ‘témoignage’.
Humanitarian ‘témoignage’ and the multiple functions of the
‘superstes’
‘Témoignage’ (imperfectly translated from French as ‘testi-
mony’) is above all a concept grounded in the history of MSF, and
which corresponds to the onset of a ‘second generation’ of
humanitarianism distinguishing itself from the time-honoured
tradition of political silence as exempliﬁed by the Red Cross
Movement. The concept has proven eminently debatable, versatile
and subject to constant reinterpretation and revisiting (Givoni,
2011). It has been much commented on, both internally at MSF
and by scholars. ‘Témoignage’ has classically been the prominent
reason expressed by MSF and similar organisations to justify the
publication of narratives (press releases, typically) and pictorial
representations of the victims they attend. With reference to some
of the interpretations of the word ‘témoignage’ in past and present
MSF contexts, I will examine and rank ﬁve distinct qualiﬁers per-
taining to images of suffering bodies, i.e. giving voice, speaking out,
advocacy, legitimacy and resource mobilisation.
Giving voice is the most selﬂess expression of ‘témoignage’. A
perfect example is the display of portraits and accounts of survivors
of the Bisesero massacre in Rwanda in 1994 in a book by African
Rights (1997). The witness here is the survivor, or what Didier
Fassin (2012, pp. 204e209), following Giorgio Agamben, would
call ‘superstes’ in contrast to ‘testis’ or third-party witnesses.2
Testimony of this sort is a circumstance whereby the victim is in
perfect command of his or her claim or appeal to the public. The
organisation (if any is needed) offering to render voices public is
self-effacing and unambiguously altruistic; it may also have
a pedagogical and historical intention.
Speaking out is of a different nature. Here, the victim is an
instrument enacting Sontag’s ‘moral outrage’. The voice still comes
from the victim, but the outrage is an expression by the witness. As
Fassin (2012, p. 206) puts it, in this case ‘.humanitarian workers, on
the basis of a moral imperative, take on the role of witness for those
they assist; although they are rarely explicitly mandated to do so, they
set themselves up as spokespeople for the oppressed in order to make
their suffering public’. Still, speaking out can become a moral
necessity. For example, in the words of Orbinski, Beyrer, and Singh
(2007), ‘What is good or right has no moral neutrality when one is2 The claim that humanitarian workers might be called as third-party witnesses
to testify in war crime trials before the International Court of Justice is a recent and
politically charged misinterpretation of the meaning of ‘testimony’. In some cases,
this has generated misperceptions by host authorities who question the impar-
tiality of ‘Dunantist’ organisations. This is one more reason e and an important
operational one e why different understandings of the word ‘témoignage’ must be
deﬁned as precisely as possible in their humanitarian contexts.confronted with attempted or actual genocide, wilful ignorance of
public-health threats, or the intimidation of care givers. Speaking out
might not deﬁnitely save lives, but silence certainly kills’. Speaking out
thus expresses both outrage and a call for action.
With advocacy we move to another dimension of ‘témoignage’,
typically ﬁnding substance in the outcome of vertical programs
(Fuller, 2006). Advocacy is essentially a political act (Barnett &
Weiss, 2008, pp. 37e38), not necessarily to the direct beneﬁt of
an individual chosen to express his or her condition of victimhood.
What counts here at least is the plea by the community of victims
who share the same fate as the one chosen as their symbol by any
organisation powerful enough to mobilise instruments of advocacy
as it sees ﬁt. The community can either be culturally deﬁned or be
a mere nosological construction (e.g. the ‘AIDS community’). More
broadly, advocacy challenges ‘rich and powerful leaders, institutions
and nation states with the goal of mobilising resources e ﬁnance,
political will or human motivationse on behalf of [a] particular health
action’ (Alkire & Chen, 2004).
A further function of ‘témoignage’ is part of the exercise of
legitimacy. Through their necessary commitment to publicity and
accountability (for example by issuing narratives, statistics or
pictures), humanitarian organisations constantly declare their
informal legitimacy (Calain, 2012). In this respect, the choices of
intervention by humanitarian organisations cannot generally be
said to obey the ‘rule of rescue’ (McKie & Richardson, 2003) for the
simple reason that victims become identiﬁable through the
communication channels of humanitarian organisations, not as the
result of an incidental encounter but from deliberate choices to
represent certain suffering bodies rather than others (manuscript
submitted).
Finally, resource mobilisation or, more broadly, the nurturing of
philanthropic sentiments in the public is often the ultimate reason
for pictorial displays of suffering bodies. This is not in itself an
activity which is necessarily morally problematic, and even less to
the extent that ﬁnancial and operational independence contributes
to the reactivity of organisations. However, this is where the risk of
the objectiﬁcation of victims is the most obvious (Nussbaum, 1995,
p. 257), and where ethical clarity is the most needed.
My ranking of several interpretations of ‘témoignage’ is not
a value judgement from good to bad, rather away to realise how the
subjects of pictorial displays progressively become instruments, as
one moves from reasons for giving voice to speaking out to advo-
cacy to legitimacy to resource mobilisation. In most cases, such
reasons are not outrightly explicit, or several reasons genuinely
coexist at the time of photo-taking. This is another reason why the
exact meaning of consenting to pictures being taken in humani-
tarian contexts is questionable, unless (hypothetically) what
exactly is being consented to can be made explicit. In addition,
pictorial materials can be kept in media repositories for future and
unspeciﬁed use in a way that could be compared to contemporary
biobanks in its ethical implications. Accordingly, humanitarian
imagery would be a similar case where ‘broad consent’ should be
considered. However, it is still a matter of debate whether the
absence e at the time of the ‘sampling’ e of speciﬁc information
about future uses of donated materials for biobanks is ethically
justiﬁed, and if broad consent is acceptable or not (Sheehan, 2011).
Conclusions
The representation of suffering bodies is a conspicuous and
unavoidable trait of modern humanitarianism, which has gained
the status of a social norm. When humanitarian medical organi-
sations like MSF exercise media activities and display suffering
bodies, they implicitly put the ethical norms and values of at least
two overlapping disciplines into conﬂict: clinical medicine and
P. Calain / Social Science & Medicine 98 (2013) 278e285284humanitarian action. Obtaining consent from the victims or
communities is important as an endeavour, but ensuring genuine
consent in humanitarian situations faces considerable practical and
substantive problems when it comes to pictorial representation. On
the other hand, rejecting any display of human suffering as
incompatible with biomedical norms would not only be unrealistic
but dismissive of highly valuable moral activities undertaken by
humanitarian agents, such as giving voice to victims or creating
empathy. When strict reliance on consent is impossible and the
exposure of victims to media is deemed necessary as part of
humanitarian action, one should ﬁrst consider if there are genu-
inely humanitarian reasons which have equal or (preferably) higher
moral weight than the strict respect of the victims’ autonomy. As I
have suggested, the weight of strictly humanitarian reasons
increases in the scale of things if these reasons lead to: (i) signiﬁ-
cant action beneﬁtting the victims or (ii) more primordial forms of
‘témoignage’ that do not manipulate the subjects or communities
represented. Such a calculation is likely to be difﬁcult and subject to
different interpretations. It is however a ﬁrst and essential step in
bringing moral clarity, awareness and honesty to objectives and
values involved in humanitarian photojournalism.
This analysis is a preliminary approach to an important moral
issue associated with the public representation of suffering. It calls
for deeper examination of the topic and reveals a need for more
dialogue between the disciplines of biomedicine, humanitarianism
and photojournalism. We should also seek more empirical data on
attitudes and values with regard to representations of suffering.
These should be collected from all professions working in the
humanitarian ﬁelds and more importantly from the victims
themselves. One shortcoming of this paper is that it fails to provide
the voice of photojournalists. At the same time, it is a technical and
artistic challenge addressed to them. Powerful images of suffering
or destitution can certainly be captured with utter respect for the
dignity and autonomy of victims, for example circumstantial or
empowering representations. Obviously, not all pictorial repre-
sentations of suffering bodies are problematic from an ethical point
of view. Some examples of respectful and compassionate pictorial
displays invite humanitarians and others to take some distance
from common stereotypes conveyed by contemporary mainstream
media representations.
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